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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
EV AN P. JONES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
LOGAN CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 10622 
This is an action by the Plaintiff to obtain an injunc-
tion enjoining Logan City Corporation from destroying 
Plaintiff's house pursuant to an order of Logan City's 
Board of Condemnation finding the house to be a menace 
to public safety. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court and the Court entered 
a judgment for the defendant dismissing plaintiff's com-
plaint and holding the Logan City Ordinance constitu-
tional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law, or that failing, for 
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a modification of the judgment permitting plaintiff to 
appear before the Logan City Board of Condemnation and 
present evidence showing plaintiff's house is not a menace 
to public safety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A short time prior to June 2, 1965, the Chairman of 
the Logan City Condemnation Board investigated the 
property owned by the plaintiff. He said that he felt the 
conditions of the home on the property required a hear-
ing by the Logan City Board of Condemnation. The 
house was constructed over sixty years ago and prior to 
the enactment of Logan City Ordinances No. 120 through 
No. 125. The house is located on a block where there 
are similar houses, constructed about the same time and 
of the same material which are also still being used. 
(Tr. 11-13) 
The Chairman of the Board, the chief of the city fire 
department, and the other two members of the board, the 
city health officer and the building inspector, prepared 
and signed a notice that a hearing would be held on 
June 16, 1965 at the Logan City Commission Office, 
On June 2, 1965 a copy of this notice was mailed ad-
dressed to Evan P. Jones and Veda P. Jones at 188 West 
5th North Street, Logan, Utah, and was sent by certified 
mail, return receipt requested. The Post Office returned 
the letter as unclaimed. (Tr. 17-19) At this time and 
for the past twelve years, the plaintiff, Evan P. Jones, has 
resided at Paris, Idaho. (Tr. 12) The Chairman of the 
Logan City Condemnation Board knew that Evan P. 
Jones resided at Paris, Idaho. (Tr. 27) On or about 
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June 2, 1965 a copy of the notice was also poste<l on the 
property in question located at 476 North 2nd West in 
Logan. The defendant introduced testimony from a 15 
\ear old neighbor across the street who admitted that 
every day his mother had to look out her kitchen window 
at the house while she washed dishes and she thought it 
was very unsightly. (Tr. 31-32) This young neighbor 
said that sometime after school was out he saw the plain-
tiff take the notice off the house. Mr. Jones, testified 
that he hadn't been in Logan during that summer, th'.lt 
lte had never received notice of the proceedings and that 
the only notice, oral or written, he had received was a 
letter dated October 1.5, 1965, advising him that since 
the time for appeal had expired, his house would be des-
troyed on October 25, 1965. (Tr. 12-14). 
The Chairman of the Logan City Condemnation 
Board testified that a hearing was held on June 16, 1965, 
hut neither Veda P. Jones nor the plaintiff, Evan P. Jones 
were present. Over the objection of the plaintiff a pur-
ported copy of the Board's findings that the building and 
stmcture located on the property constituted "a menace 
to public safety" and ordering it "demolished" within 
sixty days was introduced in evidence. The original re-
cord of such finding nor a certified copy of the same were 
not presented for admission and no explanation was made 
as to why they were not available. 
An alleged copy of the original finding was served 
on Veda P. Jones, but even though the Chairman of the 
Logan City Board of Condemnation knew Evan P. Jones 
resided in Paris, Idaho, no copy of the finding was ever 
SPrvecl on him or mailed to him at that address. 
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On or about October 20, 1965, the plaintiff received 
a letter advising him that his house would be destroyed 
on October 25, 1965 as the time for appeal had expired 
and on that day he commenced this action. 
The Chairman of the Logan City Board of Condem-
nation admitted that there was no written standard from 
which it could be determined whether or not a building 
constituted a menace to public safety and he also admitted 
that his decision and those of the other members of thr 
board was "subjective." (Tr. 27). On redirect examina-
tion the Chairman said that his decision was also partly 
based on his knowledge of some fire ordinance which was 
never introduced in evidence. (Tr. 28). 
At the trial the defendant Logan City asked the 
Chairman of the Board of Condemnation to discuss the 
facts upon which he based his decision. This question 
was objected to by the plaintiff because the defendant 
had not alleged in its answer that the plaintiff's house was 
a "menace to public safety" nor that it was a "nuisance." 
Therefore it was plaintiff's construction of the pleadings 
that the defendant Logan City was proceeding on the 
theory that it was beyond the power of the Court to 
review the determination by the Logan City Board of 
Condemnation as its finding that the plaintiff's house 
constituted a "menace to public safety" was final except 
for review by the Board of Adjustment of Logan City. 
The Court apparently agreed with plaintiff's understand-
ing as it sustained plaintiff's objection to the offered testi-
mony. (Tr. 23-2.5). 
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Logan City 
was proceeding under Ordinance Nos. 120 through Nos. 
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125 (Exhibits 1-6) which was admitted in Defendant's 
;dlS\Vl'L 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I: The District Court erred in holding that Logan 
City had authority to redelegate to a Board of Con-
rlemnation the power to legislate or adjudicate the 
conditions under which a house constitutes a "menace 
to pnblic safety." 
POINT II: The District Court erred in holding that the 
Logan City Board of Commissioners had established 
an adequate standard under which a City Board of 
Condemnation could determine when a house cons-
tituted a "menace to public safety." 
Point III: The District Court erred in holding that Logan 
City had authority to demolish a residence in absence 
of an immediate threat to safety without affording 
the owner an opportunity to repair the same. 
POINT IV: The District Court erred in not requiring 
Logan City to use good faith in giving notice to the 
owner of a house prior to determining that it should 
be demolished. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LOGAN CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO REDELE-
CATE TO A BOARD A LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL 
POWER TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES A 
"i\IEN ACE TO PUBLIC SAFETY." 
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It seems to be well settled in this state that a city 
organized under the general law only has such powers as 
are given to it by the state legislature. That a municipal 
corporation in the exercise of all its duties including those 
most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the 
State. See Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River Water Works 
Inv. Co., 16 Utah 440, 52 P. 697, 41 LR.A. 305; Salt Lake 
City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234; Wadsworth v. 
Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P2d 161; Walton v. Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P2d 724; Salt Lake City 
v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124, P2d 537; Ritholz v. City 
of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702. The Utah 
Supreme Court has said: 
"We are committed to the principle that cities have 
none of the elements of sovereignty .. " ( Nasfell v. 
Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 346, 249 P 2d 507). 
"A city organized and operating under general law 
may possess and exercise only the powers granted in 
express words (by an act of the legislature) and such 
as are necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to 
the powers expressly granted or those essential to the 
declared objects and purposes of the corporation and 
not merely convenient but indispensable." (Wads-
worth v. Santaquin City, supra.) 
" .. any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning 
the existence of the power is resolved by the courts 
against the corporation (city) and the power denied." 
(Salt Lake City v. Revene, supra.) 
In enacting Ordinances Nos. '120 through 125 it ap-
pears that Logan City proceeded under the general grant 
of legislative power given to the board of commissioners 
in Section 10-6-79, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the 
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specific authority contained in Section 10-8-52, U. C. A. 
1953: 
"They may define fire limits and prescrible limits 
within which no building shall be constructed except 
of brick, stone or other incombustible material, with-
out permission, and may cause the destruction or 
removal of any building constructed or repaired in 
violation of any ordinance, and cause all buildings 
and enclosures which may be in a dangerous state 
to be put in a safe condition, or removed." 
or in Section 10-8-60, U. C. A. 1953: 
"They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and 
abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who 
may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist." 
But none of the cited statutes give the Board of Commis-
sioners the power to redelegate their legislative power to 
a Board of a city. 
In Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 67, 48 P. 150, the 
city by ordinance defined the fire limits and provided 
that no buildings could be erected within such limits of 
combustible material. The Court said: 
"The erection of buildings with combustible materials 
may be prohibited by ordinance, and the granting of 
permission for the erection of such building may 
likewise, by ordinance, be regulated and restricted. 
Such was doubtless the intention of the legislah1re. 
The power thus conferred by the legislature upon 
the city council is, however, of a legislative char-
acter, and may not be delegated by the council to 
a committee. Such power being vested in the coun-
cil, it must be exercised by it." 
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The city also added a provision that the "Committee on 
Buildings" may establish regulations and restrictions un-
der which a combustible building could be erected. The 
court said: 
"By adding the proviso, however, the council has at-
tempted to confer upon a committee, not only an 
absolute power, which would enable it to defeat the 
very object of the ordinance at its mere will and 
pleasure, but also a legislative power, which would 
enable it to perform a duty imposed upon the council 
itself by the statute, and that is to provide regula-
tions and restrictions to control the granting of per-
mission according to the provisions of the ordinance. 
This the council had no power to do ... while a citv 
council in this state may prohibit, by ordinance, the 
construction of buildings, within fire limits, or com-
bustible material, still it cannot confer a power upon 
a committee, such as is attempted to be conferred by 
the proviso, which may be used as a means for unjust 
and arbitrary discrimination between citizens. If 
this proviso were valid, then, no matter what regula-
tions and restrictions the committee might adopt, it 
would still be within its power to grant permission 
to one person to erect a wooden building, and refuse 
the privilege to another under the same circum-
stances. The statute vested in the council the exer-
cise of powers of legislation respecting the establish-
ing of fire limits and the construction of buildings 
therein. This demands a discretion in the council 
itself, and cannot be delegated. 
In Logan City the Board of Commissioners have 
given the Board of Condemnation the discretionary power 
to determine when a building is in a dangerous state and 
to direct whether it shall be put in a safe condition or 
removed. In Ordinance No. 120: 
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"Said board of condemnation is hereby granted the 
power .. to find and determine whether any build-
ing or other structure constitutes a menace to public 
safety." 
and in Ordinance No. 124: 
"Every building found by the board of condemnation 
to constitute a menace to .. public safety, shall, if 
11ot destroyed .. within the time allowed by and in 
accordance with the finding of the board, shall be 
deemed, and every such building is hereby declared 
to be a public nuisance and every such nuisance may 
he abated summarily by the building inspector under 
the order and direction of the board of condem-
nation." 
The Board of Condemnation can thus use its power 
as "a means for unjust and arbitrary discrimination be-
tween citizens" as it has done by proceeding against plain-
tiff's house even though there are others on the same 
block built of the same material at the same time. (Tr. 
13). 
Even where the legislature has authorized a city to 
establish a board the Court has said that the Board of 
Commissioners cannot delegate their legislative powers. 
In Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., supra. the Court 
said: 
"It requires no citation of authority to establish that 
the Commission could not delegate to the Board or 
any other administrative officer its legislative powers 
or functions . . 
"The powers of the Board (of adjustment) are the 
same as the powers of the Inspector and that in pass-
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ing on appeals the Board may only do that which the 
inspector may have done in the first instance." 
The difference between what the Board of Commissioners 
may do and what the Board of Condemnation can do is 
the difference between legislative or judicial powers and 
ministerial functions. As said in State Tax Commission 
v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P2d 120: 
"Where judgment and discretion are required of 
municipal officers they cannot be delegated without 
express legislative authority." (Quoting from Jewell 
Belting Co. v. Village of Bertha, 91 Minn. 9, 97 N. W. 
424, 425.) 
The Court also defined a ministerial act: 
"The duty is ministerial, when the law, exacting its 
discharge, prescribes and defines the time, mode and 
occasion of its performance, with such certainty that 
nothing remains for judgment or discretion. (Citing 
Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54 Am. Rep. 65) 
"A Ministerial act may be defined to be one which 
a person performs in a given state of facts in a pre-
scribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal 
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his 
own judgment upon the propriety of the acts being 
done. (Citing 2 Bouv, Law Diet., 416; 27 Cyc. 
793) ." 
The Court found that the ascertainment by the auditor 
that there should be a penalty on the tax because of no 
negligence, intentional disregard, or fraud was a quasi 
judicial function which could not be delegated by the 
Commission. 
Here the Chairman of the Logan City Board of Con-
demnation admitted that there was no written standard 
-10-
from which plaintiff or any other person could determine 
whether or not his building was a menace to public 
,afety. The chairman admitted that his decision and that 
of the other members of the board was "subjective," 
(Tr. 27) which is defined by Webster (New Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1958) as "exhibiting or affected by personal 
bias, emotional background, etc." In other words the 
sole decision is with the members of the Board to exer-
cise their own judgment as to whether a building or 
house constih1tes a "menace to public safety." The Logan 
City Board of Commissioners has completely delegated 
:ill its legislative and judicial power to make the decis-
ion. The ascertainment of whether a menace to public 
safety existed and whether it should be destroyed or 
repaired was a quasi judicial function if not legislative 
function. As stated in State Tax Commission of Utah 
v. Katsis, supra. "From the principles laid down above, 
this could not be delegated" to the Board of Condem-
nation. 
POINT II 
PRIVATE PROPERTY CANNOT BE DESTROYED AS 
BEING A NUISANCE BY A CITY'S BOARD OF CON-
DEMNATION IN ABSENCE OF A STANDARD TO 
CONTROL AND GUIDE THE BOARD. 
The plaintiff alleged and the defendant admitted that 
in proceeding to demolish plaintiff's house the defendant 
was acting under Ordinances Nos. 120 through 125. No 
other ordinance which established a standard for the 
action of the Board of Condemnation was introduced in 
evidence. The Chairman of the Board of Condemnation 
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admitted that there was no written standard upon whil'h 
his decisions and those of the members of the board were 
based. Their decision was "subjective." (Tr. 27). 
In a concurring opinion in Revne v. Trade Com-
mission, 113 Utah 155, 178, 192, P2d 563, Justice Latimer 
states the general rule: 
" .. the act is defective in that the lack of standards 
to control and guide the administrative agency, per-
mits the agency to be unfettered and uncontrolled, 
and the sole judge of what may or may not be for 
the welfare of the people . and therefore, the powers 
delegated are too broad and sweeping. This renders 
the act unconstitutional." 
At page 173 he also says: 
"It is impossible to find any definite standards in 
the act to guide the board, other than its discretion 
as to what is good and proper for the health and 
safety of the public." 
The only standard the Logan City Board of Commissioners 
has given the Board of condemnation is whether the build-
ing is a "menace to public safety." This is a complete 
abdication of the Board of Commissioners power to de-
termine whether a building is "in a dangerous state" 
which was delegated by the legislature in Section 10-8-52, 
supra. It also gives the Board of Condemnation the power 
to determine when a home is a "menace to public safety" 
and notwithstanding such determination the next day an 
identical home could be determined not to be a "menace 
to public safety" by the same Board as there is nothing in 
the ordinance that requires a uniform rule of action by 
the Board of Condemnation. 
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The general rule is stated in 37 Am. Jur. Municipal 
Corporations Section 160 at page 778: 
" .. it is established, that any municipal ordinance 
which vests an arbitrary discretion in public admin-
istrative officials with reference to the rights, pro-
perty, or business of individuals, without prescribing a 
uniform rule of action, making the enjoyment of such 
rights depend upon arbitrary choice of the officers 
without reference to all persons of the class to which 
the ordinance is intended to be applicable, and with-
out furnishing any definite standard for the control 
of the officers, is unconstitutional, void and beyond 
the powers of a municipality." 
Jn People v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377, an 
ordinance permitting destruction by officers of "any build-
ing, or other structure, which for want of proper repair, 
or by reason of age and dilapidated condition, or for any 
cause, is especially liable to fire, and which is so situated 
as to endanger other buildings or property, or so occupied 
that fire would endanger persons or property therein . " 
was held not to supply a sufficient standard to meet con-
stitutional requirements. 
In Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. 322 Mo. 
:342, 15 S. W. 2d 343, "any building, any structure or 
part thereof that is unsafe as to fire or for the purpose 
used, or has become unsafe from fire, decay, or other 
causes, . " was held to be an insufficient standard the 
Court saying that the council could have fixed a standard 
for the guidance of the administrative body. 
In Gulf Ref. Co. v. Dallas (Texas) 10 S. W. 2d 151, 
"the nearness or proximity to existing dwelling houses" 
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or that "the health of adjacent inhabitants will be greath 
menaced or in danger or would seriously offend th;, 
morals, good health, convenience, comfort, prosperity and 
general welfare of those residing in said district" was an 
insufficient standard and violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution because "The 
ordinance does not define the degree of hurt, injury or 
inconvenience to make the structure an undesirable one .. 
hut vests in the building inspector the right to exercise 
his own personal views." 
Not only does the Logan city ordinance vest in tl1c 
Board of Condemnation the right to exercise their own 
personal views, but the Chairman of the Board of Con-
demnation admits that this is in fact what is done in 
1caching a decision. (Tr. 27). 
In Bennington v. Hawks, 100 Vt. 37, 134 A. 638, ,5() 
A.L.R. 983, the court said: 
"In order to make the increased fire hazard a basis 
for declaring a building a public nuisance, it must 
be shown that it unnecessarily and unreasonably in-
creases that hazard .. Its hazardous character must 
be unmistakable and the dangers therefrom so im-
minent and extraordinary as to make an irreparable 
result probable rather than possible." 
No such limitation is placed on the Logan City Board of 
Condemnation. Indeed as plaintiff understands the de-
fendant's position and the decision of the lower Court, 
it is within the authority of the city to permit its officers 
to exhibit personal bias or emotional background in de-
termining whether or not a building is a "menace to pnb-
lice safety." In this case the city did not plead in its 
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answer that the plaintiff's home was in fact a "menace to 
public safety" and therefore the action of the city was 
lawful. As a result the plaintiff objected to any evidence 
]wing introduced on the subject. The plaintiff wanted 
the court to proceed on the issue that regardless of 
whether or not plaintiff's home is a "menace to public 
":afcty" does a Board of a City have the power to deter-
mine that fact and destroy plaintiff's home without any 
provision for review by the City Commission"', the courts 
without any delegation of legislative authority to cities 
to allow a Board to so determine and without any standard 
established by a city ordinance as to what conditions the 
lJOard must find before it can determine that a building 
is a "menace to public safety." If the Board does not 
have to find that there is a structural weakness in the 
house which would make it unsafe to remain standing 
under the weight of the occupants and contents, or that 
the heating system does not keep the heat below the 
point of combustion of surrounding combustible materials 
or some other standard showing an actual danger to the 
public, then regardless of the Court's review and deter-
mination that plaintiff's building is not a nuisance, is not 
a "menace to public safety" in the Court's opinion, the 
Court would still be required to uphold the action of the 
Board which has already been shown to be arbitrary with 
1 egard to the plaintiff. 
"It should be noted that the appeal provision in Ordinance 
No. 122 does not provide for appeal to the City Commis-
sioners, but to the Board of Adjustment composed of City -
Judge, Chief of Police, and two other citizens and taxpayers 
appointed by the Mayor as provided in Ordinance No. 101 
creating a Board of Adjustment and providing that one 
member of Zoning Commission shall serve on the Board. 
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It has been said in 39 Am. Jur. Nuisances, Section 
l 90, page 467: 
"Usually in suits of this character the burden is on 
the defendant to prove a justification. So, in a suit 
to restrain city officials from destroying property as 
a nuisance, the burden is on the city of showing that 
it is in fact a nuisance, by competent evidence, the 
same as any other fact is established, and evidence is 
not admissible of a finding of public officials that it 
is a nuisance . " 
The defendant Logan City, having failed to plead that 
plaintiff's home is in fact a nuisance and, therefore, not 
having been able to offer evidence in support thereof, 
should be held enjoined from having plaintiff's house 
demolished as being a nuisance. The finding of the 
Board as indicated above is not evidence that plaintiff's 
house is a nuisance and in view of the requirements of 
Section 78-2.5-16 as to evidence of the contents of a writ-
ing there is a question whether or not the finding should 
have been admitted in evidence, since the Board did not 
produce the original nor explain that it had been recorded 
and this was a copy thereof or afford the plaintiff any 
other means of determining whether or not the finding 
of the Board was as offered. 
In fact the alleged findings by the Board is not a 
"finding" at all, but a mere conclusion of law based on 
no facts which appear in the alleged order of the Board 
of Condemnation. Without any knowledge of the facts 
upon which such conclusion was based, plaintiff is help-
less to know what steps he should take to repair his house 
if it in fact has any defects which constitutes it a menace 
to public safetv. 
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POINT III 
THE AUTHORITY OF CITIES IN RELATION TO 
RUILDINGS IN A DANGEROUS STATE (NOT PRE-
SENTING AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO SAFETY SO 
AS TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION) IS 
LIMITED TO DIRECTING REPAIR OR REMOVAL. 
At the hearing on the temporary restraining order the 
Court indicated to the parties that they should try to 
settle the matter. Accordingly the plaintiff in good faith 
had his attorney write to Logan City offering to paint 
his house, put in new windows, and install a new furnace. 
If this was not sufficient the plaintiff requested advice 
as to what additional requirements the City would im-
pose. 
The City replied by showing the plaintiff's attorney 
a copy of a report of the building inspector which plain-
tiff felt and the Court seemed to agree was not a sufficient 
reply by Logan City. (Tr. 4-6). The plaintiff would 
still like to know what requirements the City has in order 
to preserve his house from destruction. But since the 
decision of the Board of Condemnation is that his house 
!Je destroyed it appears that Logan City has usurped the 
authority granted by Section 10-8-52, supra., in not giving 
plaintiff an opportunity to repair his house. It seems 
evident that his house does not impose such an immediate 
threat to public safety that it must immediately be des-
troyed since it has been standing without objection from 
anyone between June 16, 1965, the date of the original 
finding and October 15, 1965, the date of the letter from 
the Board of Condemnation. 
-17-
The Utah Legislature has said (Section 10-8-.52, 
supra.) that the city may cause all buildings and en 
closures which may be in a dangerous state to be put ilJ 
a safe condition, or removed. The plaintiff has not been 
given an opportunity to put his house in a safe condition 
and if the lower court is sustained his house will be des-
troyed without his ever having that opportunity. The 
plaintiff believed that the Court's comments indicated that 
if the ordinance was constitutional the plaintiff would 
be entitled to action by the Logan City Board of Com-
missioners. (Tr. 5). 
It is respectfully submitted that if the Supreme Court 
finds against the Plaintiff on the other points, the limita-
tions of power held by Municipal Corporations discussed 
under Point No. I above should permit the Court to pro-
vide that Logan City must re-open the hearing to pennit 
evidence as to what must be done in order to put plain-
tiff's house in a safe condition and there must be a finding 
by the Board of Condemnation on this point. 
POINT IV. 
A PROPERTY OWNER IS ENTITLED TO THE EXER-
CISE OF GOOD FAITH BY THE CITY IN GIVING 
NOTICE OF A HEARING FOR DESTRUCTION OF 
PROPERTY. 
If the Court finds against the Plaintiff on the above 
points it is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff should 
be entitled to have a hearing on whether or not his house 
is in fact a "menace to public safety." Ordinance No. 120 
provides that the notice of the hearing should be mailed 
to the owner at his "last known address." The Chairman 
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0 j the lloard of Condemnation admits that he knew that 
tht' plaintiff resides in Paris, Idaho. (Tr. 27). The plain-
tiffs uncontradicted testimony is that he has resided there 
for the past twelve years. (Tr. 12). 
The lower Court found that the plaintiff had actual 
notice of the hearing on the basis of the testiminy of a 
neighbor hoy, age 1.5 years, that he saw plaintiff take the 
notice off the house. The plaintiff does not question the 
right of the Court to believe the testimony of a 15 year 
uld neighbor whose mother does not enjoy looking at her 
neighbor's house as opposed to plaintiff's testimony that 
be had not been in Logan during that summer. But the 
question is whether the rights of property owners should 
depend solely on the testimony of a boy. 
Our rule with regard to service of summons requires 
it to be served by a person over the age of 21 years (Rule 
4 (d) (1), Rules of Civil Procedure, U. C. A. 1953.) In 
Liebhart v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 Pac. 215 the Utah 
Supreme Court requires an affidavit in good faith as to 
the last known residence where service could not be had 
personally on the defendant. In Perkins v. Spencer, 121 
Utah 468, 243 P2d 446, the Supreme Court required strict 
compliance with the alternate to personal service. In that 
case the circumstances were very similar to the situation 
here. A copy of the decision of the Board was served on 
Mrs. Veda Jones who is separated from her husband and 
lives in Logan, but no copy was mailed to the Plaintiff 
who lives in Paris, Idaho so he had no chance to appea] 
the decision. In the Perkins case a copy of the notice 
was left with the wife, but no copy was mailed to the 
husband at his last known address. 
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It is respectfully submitted that if the Court finds 
that the City Commission can delegate such a wide dis-
cretion to its Board of Condemnation which permits it to 
destroy a property owner's home without being governed 
by any standard, and without affording the property 
owner an opportunity to repair the same, then the Court 
should also impose a high standard of fairness on the 
Board in its procedures. So that where the Chairman 
of the Board knows the plaintiff's address and does not 
mail a notice to him at that address, the Board should 
be required to re-open its proceedings for a determination 
as to whether or not the plaintiff can present evidence 
of the soundness of his home which will change the per-
sonal bias of the members of the Board and permit plain-
tiff to retain his house. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ted S. Perry 
Attorney for Plaintiff-appellant 
106 Church Ave. 
Logan, Utah 
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